Substantive or Procedural? First, we must address Owens-Corning's argument that a federal court sitting in diversity cannot apply Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure because it is a procedural rather than a substantive rule. Yet, ultimately, Owens-Corning concedes, as it must, that this question has already been decided by this Court in Fauber v. Kem Transportation and Equipment Co., 876 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1989). In that case, we held that Rule 238 is substantive and must be followed by federal courts sitting in diversity cases. Id. at 328. Counsel is thus implicitly asking this panel to overrule Fauber. We note that this Court's Internal Operating Procedures prohibit a panel of this Court from overruling a published opinion of a previous panel. See Internal Operating Procedure Rule 9.1 ("[T]he holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels."). Because we are bound by Fauber, and in any event do not question its wisdom, we reiterate that it is proper for a federal district court sitting in diversity to award delay damages to a plaintiff under Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
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